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LEGAL ASPECTS OF A FEDERAL WATER
QUALITY SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM
Jon T. Brown*
and
Wallace L. Duncan**
of the major problems in controlling water pollution is
the collection of data to measure pollution and to identify
polluters. Existing law is relatively silent on this important matter.
For example, in abatement proceedings under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,1 it must be shown that the pollution has reduced
water quality below the standards established under that Act.2 But
the Act is largely silent as to how specific evidence of such pollution
is to be obtained. In many cases, that evidence may be gathered
from the data that have been disclosed by the polluter in a report
the preparation and filing of which have been requested by the
Secretary of the Interior.3 In any case, however, initial detection of
pollution and identification of the polluter must first have been
accomplished either by state or local governments-by means that
remain unspecified by the statute4-or, in certain cases, by the Sec-
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1. 62 Stat. ll55 (1948), as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 466-66k (1964), as amended, 33
U.S.C. §§ 466-66n (Supp. IV, 1965-1968), as amended, National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852, as amended, Water Quality Improvement
Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91.
2. See 33 U.S.C. § 466g(c) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968), which provides for the states to
establish standards for water quality.
3. 33 U.S.C. § 466g(k)(l) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968) provides that the Secretary, if so
requested by a conference of state and interstate water pollution agencies, may require
an alleged polluter to file a report "based on existing data, furnishing such information
as may reasonably be requested as to the character, kind, and quantity of such discharges and the use of facilities or other means to prevent or reduce such discharges
by the person filing such a report."
4. 33 U.S.C. § 466g(d) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968) requires the Secretary to convene a
conference of pollution agencies when so requested by a state governor, but the statute
is silent with respect to the means by which the governor is to have learned of the
pollution and of suspected polluters. 33 U.S.C. § 466g(c) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968) provides
for the development of water quality standards, but is similarly silent with respect to
the means by which adherence to those standards is to be determined.
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retary on the basis of "reports, surveys, or studies.'' 5 Since such detection and identification are crucial to the effective enforcement of
the water quality standards, adequate means for collecting data relating to water quality should be established.
Collection of water quality data is also important for the purpose
of determining the present and future needs for water resources and
for the purpose of determining the proper allocation of limited financial resources among those needs. In addition, such data are necessary in order to conduct research studies and in order to determine
water quality trends for the purposes of long-range planning.
Perhaps the best way to collect such data would be to establish
a national surveillance system designed to monitor the quality of the
nation's water resources. Such a national system is currently under
consideration by the Federal Water Quality Administration. 6 That
system would involve the use of contemporary scientific data-gathering devices and telemetering equipment. Essentially, the system
would consist of a series of surveillance stations located at various
points along rivers and streams and at the edges of lakes and reservoirs. These stations would utilize automatic sampling and datagathering equipment to monitor water quality, and would transmit
the resulting information by automatic telemetering devices to central data banks for observation and analysis. Much of the scientific
equipment necessary for such a system is fully developed and would
require only minor modifications in order to operate effectively in
the surveillance system. Other equipment might require further development before reaching an acceptable level of reliability and
accuracy; but the technology for that development is available, and
there is little doubt that such a surveillance system can be developed
if the Government is prepared to move in that direction. It is the
purpose of this Article to examine the legal mechanisms necessary for
the establishment of such a system, to determine the extent to which
existing laws can be used to that end, and to point out the areas
in which some congressional action may be necessary in order to
complete the legal foundation for a national water quality surveillance program.
5. 33 U.S.C. § 466g(d) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968) permits the Secretary to initiate a con•
ference even when not requested by a state government, but only when he has reason
to believe, on the basis of reports, surveys, or studies, that pollution is occuring which
is "endangering the health or welfare of persons in a State other than that in which
the discharge or discharges originate • • ." or that substantial economic injury is
resulting from the inability, due to the pollution, to market shellfish in interstate
commerce.
6. A comprehensive study and proposal has been submitted by Cyrus Wm. Rice &:
Company, Pittsburgh, Pa.
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CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY AUTHORITY FOR THE

ESTABLISHMENT OF A FEDERAL WATER QUALITY SURVEILLANCE
SYSTEM

The threshold question in the establishment of a federal water
quality surveillance system is whether there is adequate authority for
creation of such a system. The necessary authority must be found
both in the Constitution and in statutes. An initial requirement,
then, is that the rivers and streams which are to be monitored be of
a type over which the United States is empowered by the Constitution
to exercise its authority. In order to comply with the traditional
requirements of the commerce clause, congressional power respecting
rivers and streams may reach only those rivers and streams which are
either "navigable" or "interstate." 7
The judicial definition of "navigability" has not remained constant, although its general parameters were set out in the late nineteenth century in the case of The Daniel Ball.8 In that case the
Court held that streams are "public navigable rivers in law which
are navigable in fact. And they are navigable in fact when they are
used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition,
as highways of commerce." 9 According to subsequent interpretations
of Daniel Ball, a stream is navigable in full if it is navigable in
part,10 and it remains navigable even if no longer subject to commercial use. 11 In United States v. Appalachian Power Company,12
decided in 1940, the definition of navigability was broadened to include those streams which are potentially susceptible of navigation.
Finally, in United States v. Grand River Dam Authority,13 a 1960
case, the Supreme Court determined that nonnavigable tributaries
7. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I (1824); 33 U.S.C. § 466g(a) (Supp.
IV, 1965-1968). On the other hand, it may not be necessary to limit constitutional
authority to the "navigable" and "interstate" streams. If the question is simply whether
there is constitutional authority to establish a surveillance system, the United States
could actually establish stations even in streams that are not navigable or interstate,
on the ground that polluters, wherever located, are subject to regulation under the
commerce power, if their activities-that is, their products-affect commerce. Under
this approach, it would not be necessary that pollution reach interstate or navigable
waters, but only that products of polluters affect commerce. Such an effect upon
commerce might arise from the fact that if polluters on intrastate, nonnavigable
streams are not subject to regulation, their products in interstate commerce might
gain a competitive advantage over those of companies which, by virtue of plant location, are subject to pollution standards. See generally Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
8. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870).
9. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) at 563.
10. United States v. Rio Grande Dam &: Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
11. See Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931).
12. 311 U.S. 377.
13. 363 U.S. 299.
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of navigable streams may be subject to the commerce power of Congress as long as the main stream is "navigable" under the traditional
definitions.
With respect to the second constitutional criterion £or federal
authority-whether streams or rivers are "interstate" in nature14the position of the Government as reflected in statute is that "interstate waters" consist of "all rivers, lakes, and other waters that flow
across, or form a part of boundaries between two or more states."1"
Thus, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act does not apply to
waters which are wholly within a single state, nor does it apply
directly to waters which are merely tributaries of interstate waters.
But the term "interstate" has been construed by the Department of
the Interior to mean that if a body of water is interstate at any point,
the entire body of water is thereby interstate and subject to the
federal statute.16 Moreover, although tributaries may not be directly
subject to the Federal Act, nevertheless if any matter discharged into
such tributaries reaches interstate waters and reduces the quality of
such interstate waters below established standards, the pollution is
subject to abatement under the Act. 17
It is clear from the Supreme Court's decisions respecting navigable
waters, and to a lesser extent, from the congressional and administrative declarations respecting interstate waters, that the number of
streams over which the federal power may constitutionally extend
is immense. Only on the smallest of streams in a river basin would the
exercise of federal authority be questionable. Whether the potential
authority will be exercised, however, is another question, since the
implementation of that authority has been slow to develop, as may
be seen in the history of the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act.18 Hence, an evaluation of the possibilities £or establishing a
surveillance system requires an examination of the existing statutory
framework relating to water pollution.
14. The "interstate" criterion for federal authority seems to stem from the "navigability" definition of The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (IS70), discussed in text
accompanying notes 8-11 supra. Since "navigable" waters are those susceptible of use
in "commerce," and since that case's reference to "commerce" is to interstate commerce,
it seems that for federal authority to apply, waters must be "interstate" as well as "navigable." But for the contrary view-that federal authority need not be so limitedsee note 7 supra.
15. 33 U.S.C. § 466j(e) (1964).
16. U.S. DEPT. OF TilE INTERIOR, GUIDELINES FOR EsrABLISHING '\TATER. QUALITY
STANDARDS FOR INTERSTATE WATERS 10-11 (1966) [hereinafter GUIDELINES].
17. 33 u.s.c. § 466g(c)(5) (Supp. I, 1965); GUIDELINES 60.
18. See Barry, The Evolution of the Enforcement Provisions of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act: A Study of the Difficulty in Developing Effective Legislation,
68 MICH. L. REv. 1103 (1970).
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That framework is provided by the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act. 19 That Act, a compendium of original and amendatory
legislation, stems from legislation passed in 1948.20 It has since been
modified and strengthened by the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1956,21 the amendments of 1961,22 the Water
Quality Act of 1965,23 and the Clean Water Restoration Act of
1966.24 Additional amendments were recently added by the Water
Quality Improvement Act of 1970,25 which was signed by President
Nixon on April 3, 1970.
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act is a product both of
the necessity to halt the destruction of the nation's water resources
and of the reality of countervailing federal, state, and industrial
powers. Like many pieces of legislation, its goals tend to outstrip its
tools for implementation. The entire Act, but particularly its enforcement sections, provides only limited federal authority and often
authorizes such authority solely as a last resort. 26 Instead, it encourages cooperation between federal and state authorities and in some
instances requires such cooperation.27 Because of this tangled thicket
of compromise and accommodation, it is understandable that the
lines of authority between federal and state governments are not
clearly drawn in the Act.28 Moreover, in view of the apparent congressional concern for reconciling the interests of conflicting parties,
19. 62 Stat. 1155 (1948), as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 466-66k (1964), as amended, 33
U.S.C. §§ 466-66n (Supp. IV, 1965-1968), as amended, National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852, as amended, Water Quality Improvement
Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91.
20. 62 Stat. 1155.
21. 70 Stat. 498.
22. 75 Stat. 204.
23. 79 Stat. 903.
24. 80 Stat. 1247.
25. Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91.
26. See generally Barry, supra note 18.
27. This tone of compromise is established in § I of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 466
(1964), in which it is provided:
In connection with the exercise of jurisdiction over the waterways of the Nation
and in consequence of the benefits resulting to the public health and welfare by
the prevention and control of water pollution, it is hereby declared to be the
policy of Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities
and rights of the States in preventing and controlling water pollution, to support
and aid technical research relating to the prevention and control of water pollution, and to provide Federal technical services and financial aid to State and
interstate agencies and to municipalities in connection with the prevention and
control of water pollution.
At face value, this policy statement tends to vest enforcement activities primarily in
the states, while affording the federal government a role generally limited to research
and assistance. See also 33 U.S.C. § 466a(c) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968); 33 U.S.C. §§ 466c(a),
(c) (1964); 33 U.S.C. § 466g(b) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
28. Barry, supra note 18, at UIS.
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rather than for halting pollution, it is not surprising that the Act
fails to provide specifically for the establishment of a national water
quality surveillance system. Since such a system is neither expres~ly
prohibited nor expressly authorized by the Act. The following discussion will examine those aspects of the Act and its administration
from which the authority for a surveillance system may be drawn.
Section 3(a) of the Act provides that the Secretary of the Interior
shall
prepare or develop comprehensive programs for eliminating or reducing the pollution of interstate waters and tributaries thereof
and improving the sanitary condition of surface and underground
waters . . . . For the purpose of this section, the Secretary is
authorized to make joint investigations with any [federal, state, or
interstate] agencies of the condition of any waters in any State or
States, and of the discharges of any sewage, industrial waters, or substance which may adversely affect such waters. 29

It appears reasonable to conclude that the "joint investigations"
authorized by section 3(a) might comprehend the establishment of a
water quality surveillance system. Furthermore, the "comprehensive
programs" to be developed as a result of those "joint investigations"
could likewise include the designated programs and purposes of a
water quality surveillance system.
Several other provisions of the Act support this conclusion. Section 5(a), for example, provides that the Secretary of the Interior
"shall conduct ... research, investigations, experiments, demonstrations, and studies relating to the causes, control, and prevention of
water pollution."30 Section 5(b) allows the Secretary to conduct investigations, at the request of state or interstate agencies, on specific
pollution problems.31 Section IO(d) contemplates that the Secretary
may initiate enforcement procedures on the basis of "reports, surveys,
or studies,"32 and section 5(c) requires that the Secretary, in cooperation with federal, state, and interstate agencies, "collect and disseminate basic data on chemical, physical, and biological water
quality and other information insofar as such data or other information relate to water pollution and the prevention and control
thereof." 33 Further support is gained from section 5(e), which authorizes the Secretary to establish, equip, and maintain field laboratory
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

33
33
33
33
33

U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.

§ 466a(a) (1964).
§ 466c(a) (1964).
§ 466c(b) (1964).
§ 466g(d) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
§

466c(c) (1964).
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and research facilities, 34 and from section 5(d)(B), which authorizes
the Secretary to develop and demonstrate methods for identifying
and measuring the effect of pollutants on water uses.35 The 1970 Act
bolsters the conclusion that there exists authority for the establishment of a water quality surveillance system; it authorizes the Secretary to acquire land for demonstration projects and for the development of field laboratories and research facilities. 36
On the basis of these representative provisions of the Act, it is
reasonable to conclude that Congress has, however inexplicitly, authorized a national system for monitoring water quality. This conclusion is confirmed by the fact that the federal government is given
a major responsibility for enforcing the water quality standards
established under the Act; and without the necessary means for determining violations, such as a surveillance system, enforcement
must rest on mere conjecture.37
Executive orders issued by the Office of the President furnish
additional support for the proposition that a surveillance system may
be established under existing law. For example, section 3 of Executive Order 11,507 relating to pollution caused by federal facilities,
requires agency heads to "[m]aintain review and surveillance to ensure that [water quality standards] are met on a continuing basis."38
This executive order thus seems to contemplate the establishment of
a continuing system for monitoring the discharge of pollutants from
federal installations, although it fails to elaborate on the particulars
of such a system. Without a system of surveillance, it would be impossible "to ensure that [pollution control] standards are met on a
continuing basis."39
The executive order's authorization seems to aim at surveillance
of pollution only from federal or federally related activities. But
pollution, unlike politics, does not abide by the federal system or
adhere to the theories of states' rights. In many situations it would be
impossible for a surveillance system to monitor only those pollutants
that come from federal sources, and it would be irrational to attempt
such an approach. It is likely, therefore, that any surveillance system
established under Executive Order 11,507 to monitor pollution from
34. 33 U.S.C. § 466c(e) (1964).
35. 33 U.S.C. § 466c(d)(B) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
36. Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 5(k), Pub. L. No. 91-224, § 105(2), 84 Stat.
91 (1970). See note 118 infra and accompanying text.
37. See 33 U.S.C. § 466g(a) (1964), which provides for abatement, but makes no
provision for detecting that which is to be abated.
38. Exec. Order No. 11,507, § 3(a)(l), 35 Fed. Reg. 2573 (1970).
39. Id.
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federal sources could also be used successfully to monitor pollution
from other sources, whether state, municipal, or private, particularly
since the activities of the federal government are so extensive that
even a system which sought to monitor only those activities would
have to be a highly comprehensive one in order to be effective.
In view of the interplay among the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, the administrative regulations issued thereunder, and the
provisions of Executive Order 11,507, and in light of the interrelated
nature of the problems of water pollution, it seems probable that the
federal government has the authority under existing law to proceed
with the establishment of a federal water quality surveillance system.
To the extent that such authority is not clear, however, it may be
desirable to define it by means of a statute such as that set out in the
Appendix to this Article.40
I£ establishment of a surveillance system is to be sought under
existing law, however, the question arises whether a comprehensive
surveillance system could feasibly be established and operated exclusively by the federal government, or whether the participation of
state and interstate agencies is imperative. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act is, in general, quite protective of the interests of
the states. Section 1 of that Act declares it "to be the policy of
Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of the States in preventing and controlling water
pollution ...." 41 In establishing water quality standards under the
Act, primary responsibility again lies with the states; and it is only
after a state has failed to establish standards that the Secretary may
act affirmatively.42 Similarly, in investigation and enforcement proceedings, great respect is accorded to the interests of the states. Investigations are to be conducted jointly with state and interstate
agencies,43 and "state and interstate action to abate pollution of
interstate or navigable waters shall be encouraged and shall not ...
be displaced by Federal enforcement action." 44
It is difficult to conclude that Congress intended by those provisions that the states, whether by lack of funds or by mere intransigence, could thwart the investigations and programs necessary for the
fulfillment of the purposes of the Act. Indeed, a judgment that the
40. The proposed statute would not only explicitly authorize the establishment of
a surveillance system, but would also provide an explicit means for acquiring the land
for such a system. See pp. 1165-66 infra.
41. 33 U.S.C. § 466(b) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). See also note 27 supra.
42. 33 U.S.C. § 466g(c)(2) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
43. 33 U.S.C. § 466g(d)(l) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
44. 33 U.S.C. § 466g(b) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). See also 33 U.S.C. § 466g(c)(6) (Supp.
IV, 1965-1968).
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federal government is not so limited appears to underlie Secretary
of the Interior Walter J. Hickel's establishment, in July 1969, of the
Task Force on Pollution Enforcement. As a result of evidence
gathered by federal monitoring activities,45 that Task Force, in
September 1969, recommended the convening of hearings and the
possible initiation of litigation to halt excessive pollution in certain
areas of Kansas, Oklahoma, Ohio, and the Lake Erie Basin. In light
of the initiative taken by the Secretary in establishing such a task
force, it seems probable that the concern for state and interstate
agencies, which is exhibited in the statute, means essentially that the
federal government is directed to seek the cooperation of those agencies, but may proceed independently if such cooperation is not
offered. Consequently, it appears reasonable to conclude that the
federal government may establish a surveillance system even without
the joint participation of state and interstate agencies.
On the other hand, the political problems in such an independent
course of action could be severe, particularly since Congress has
manifested a great sensitivity to states' rights in the area of pollution
control. Yet, it is unlikely that the establishment of a federal water
quality surveillance system would encounter the same resistance as
have some other federal water resource projects, notably projects
initiated by the Army Corps of Engineers.46 For one thing, unlike
the reception that has been accorded to many federal water projects,
there has been almost universal acceptance of the necessity for the
control and abatement of water pollution and in light of the issue's
current political popularity, political opposition is likely to be small.
Second, a water quality surveillance system would not have the
disruptive effect on local economies that large-scale resource projects
often have. Finally, a federal system would alleviate the financial
burden on the states in the area of surveillance activities. But,
although the federal government may be able to proceed alone in
establishing a surveillance system, the cooperation and joint participation of state and interstate agencies should still be sought to
45. Informal conversations with the Federal Water Quality Administration indicate
that present monitoring activities are minimal. The Administration currently maintains approximately 400 surveillance sites, of which about 100 are fully automatic. The
automatic sites, of course, maintain a continuous surveillance. At the manual sites,
checking occurs from once every two weeks to once every month. The Federal Water
Quality Administration also pays the Geological Survey to maintain approximately 460
sites, of which 60 are automatic.
46. An example is the Cross-Florida Barge Canal, a Corps project authorized in
1942 as a wartime defense measure and not yet completed. Much opposition to the
canal has been aroused in recent years. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Corps of Engrs., Civ. No. 2655-69 (D. D.C., second amended complaint filed April 9,
1970); Drew, Dam Outrage: The Story of the Army Engineers, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
April 1970, at 51.
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the fullest extent. Particularly if the system is to be established largely
under existing law, efforts should be made to adhere to the cooperative tone of present statutes; and if appropriations are likely to be a
problem-as they invariably are-the costs of site acquisition and
development may be significantly reduced through intergovernmental
cooperation.47
Particularly important with respect to any cooperative efforts in
developing a surveillance system are the interstate pollution control
agencies. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act contemplated
the creation of such bodies,48 and there now exist at least ten interstate compacts which deal directly with water pollution control problems. Of the compacts only two will be discussed in some detail here,
since they are somewhat representative of the entire group. The Ohio
River Valley Sanitation Compact (ORSANC0) 49 encompasses the
states of Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, and West Virginia. The Tennessee River Basin Water
Pollution Control Compact50 numbers among its signatories the
states of Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina,
Tennessee, and Virginia. Both compacts provide for the establishment of interstate commissions; and in both cases the commissions
are vested with certain regulatory functions, including the establishment of water quality criteria. The federal government is represented
by a delegate on the ORSANCO Commission, but not on the Tennessee Commission. Neither commission is authorized to issue enforcement orders without a majority vote of the compact's commissioners.
The jurisdiction of each commission in establishing water quality
standards and issuing enforcement orders extends only to the waters
in the interstate drainage basin with which the particular compact
is concerned. Even that limited jurisdiction, however, enables the
commissions, like the federal government, to establish water quality
criteria for the entire breadth of a stream regardless of state boundaries. 51 Were it not for this authority, and the similar authority
vested in the federal government, it is conceivable, indeed likely,
that different criteria would apply on each side of a river which
47. See text accompanying note 95 infra.
48. 33 U.S.C. § 466b(b) (1964) grants congressional consent for states to enter interstate compacts, and to establish implementing administrative agencies, for cooperative
efforts in the control of pollution; but it requires further congressional approval
before any such compact becomes binding upon a party state.
49. 54 Stat. 752 (1940).
50. 72 Stat. 823 (1958).
51. The standards will not, however, apply to the entire length of a stream unless
the stream flows only through signatory states.

May 1970]

Water Quality Surveillance

1141

borders two states. Since both the federal government and the interstate-compact commissions may have authority over such interstate
streams, any differences in criteria or standards which might otherwise arise between states can be resolved. Indeed, the Federal Water
Quality Administration has already undertaken to reconcile conflicting criteria submitted by states bordering several of the Great
Lakes.
The interstate-compact commissions seem to hold over their
signatory states a power which is analogous to that of the federal
government under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. The
ORSANCO Commission, for example, is authorized to investigate,
study, and make recommendations concerning pollution problems
within its jurisdiction, to advise local governments, to confer with
other governments, and to draft and recommend remedial legislation. 52 With respect to the enforcement of water quality standards
adopted by the commission, both the ORSANCO Commission and
the Tennessee River Basin Commission are authorized to issue administrative enforcement orders and to obtain in either the state or
the federal courts orders for compliance. Finally, both compacts provide for mutual coordination in their operations. The Tennessee
River Basin Commission Compact provides that it is not to conflict
with the provisions of ORSANCO, but that the Commission is free
to set more stringent standards for the signatory states than those
provided by ORSANCO. The ORSANCO Compact has a similar
provision.
If the federal government decides to establish a national water
quality surveillance system, the compact commissions, as well as the
states, should be consulted regarding the operation of such a system.
They should be encouraged to coordinate their own surveillance
activities with those of the United States and should also be invited
to participate in the system's operations to the greatest possible extent.
II.

ACQUISITION OF SITES FOR SURVEILLANCE STATIONS

The success of any surveillance system will depend in large measure upon the acquisition of suitable sites for monitoring water
quality. Basically, there are three methods by which site acquisition
may be accomplished. First, it may be possible in some instances for
the Government to establish sites, without compensating the owners
of riparian land, by exercising the "navigation servitude." Second,
it may be possible, at little or no acquisition cost, to establish stations
on federal lands. Third, the Government may seek to acquire sites
52. 3

WATER AND WATER RIGHTS

341 (R. Clark ed. 1967).
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for surveillance stations from state and local governments and from
private owners. Significant legal problems may be encountered in all
of these approaches to site acquisition, and in some cases the resolution of those problems may require the amendment of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act. The following discussion examines the
problems involved with each method of acquisition.

A. Site Acquisition Under the Navigation Seroitude
Certain types of surveillance stations will probably not require
the use of lands which are situated above the high-water mark of a
river. This is particularly true in cases in which it may be advantageous to establish stations on pilings anchored below the high-water
mark, and in cases in which it may be desirable to place sampling
equipment-again anchored below the high-water mark-in such a
manner as to transect the stream in order to obtain readings at
various points of flow. In instances in which surveillance stations or
equipment can be situated below the high-water marks on rivers or
streams, it may be possible for the United States to exercise the
"navigation servitude" vested in the federal government and thus
to avoid incurring liability for the payment of compensation to the
owners of private lands which are riparian to the streams. The
navigation servitude, which is derived from the commerce clause
of the United States Constitution, gives the federal government dominant control of the stream bed of navigable waters up to the ordinary
high-water mark. 53 Title to any lands situated below that mark is
thus subject to the dominant interest of the United States, and the
land may be taken by the federal government without compensating
the private landowners.54
Under the traditional view, the right of the United States to take
private lands without compensation seems to be limited to those
situations in which the dominant interest is exercised in aid of
navigation.55 Courts have recognized, however, that, so long as the
interests of navigation are served, other purposes may be advanced
as well.56 Thus, in order to justify site acquisition under this traditional view of the servitude, it is necessary to demonstrate that the
establishment of surveillance stations would in fact aid navigation.
Pollution, it may be argued, is a burden on navigation because it
53. See, e.g., United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. &: P.R.R., 312 U.S. 592 (1941).
54. United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 509 (1945).
55. See, e.g., United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. &: P.R.R., 312 U.S. 592 (1941):
United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945): United States v.
Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913).
56. See, e.g., United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956).
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increases the corrosion rate of vessels and buoys, makes navigation
more difficult as a result of water-clouding, damages dock facilities,
and has numerous other deleterious effects on navigation. Since the
surveillance stations would be part of a program designed to eliminate pollution, then, they would aid navigation and thus allow the
servitude to be used for the traditional purpose of assisting navigation.
The major advantage of the argument based upon the traditional
view of the servitude is the fact that the courts are not asked to
change existing law in any manner. Rather, since the servitude is
being used for its traditional purpose, the court is required merely
to recognize that pollution is in fact a burden upon navigation and
that surveillance stations will assist in eliminating that burden.
If a surveillance system is sought to be established under existing
law, however, it will be difficult to demonstrate a legislative purpose
to aid navigation, for the federal pollution control laws, although
designed to eliminate water pollution, do not reflect an interest on
the part of Congress to assist or advance navigation. 57 Consequently,
those opposing an exercise of the servitude might reasonably argue
that since the statutory authority for the surveillance system itself is
not specifically designed to aid navigation, the servitude cannot
validly be exercised in the acquisition of surveillance sites.
Because of the difficulty confronting an argument based on the
traditional analysis, it may be preferable to base the argument for
application of the servitude on some other analysis. It may be possible, for example, to use a unique application of the public-trust
approach. Under that approach, the bed of a navigable stream is
viewed as the corpus of a public trust, such that the Government, as
trustee, may use lands situated within that stream bed without compensating private owners, so long as the use is for a public purpose
which tends to benefit all the people of the country. The idea of
57. For example, neither the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 62 Stat. 1155
(1948), as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 466-66k (1964), as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 466-66n (Supp.
IV, 1965-1968), nor its legislative history contains anything indicating an intent to
assist navigation. Nor does the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91224, 84 Stat. 91, specifically mention navigation. The Oil Pollution Act of 1924, 33
U.S.C. §§ 43-37 (1964), originally did refer to oil dumping as a "menace to navigation"
[43 Stat. 605, 33 U.S.C. § 433 (1964)], but when that Act was amended in 1966, the
reference to navigation was omitted. 80 Stat. 1253, 33 U.S.C. § 433 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
Section 108 of the Water Quality Improvement Act repeals the Oil Pollution Act of
1924 and substitutes in its place § 11 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.
Both § 11, pertaining to oil, and § 12, pertaining to other hazardous polluting
substances, state that the harmful or potentially harmful pollutants subject to
removal are those elements or compounds, including oil, which "present an imminent
and substantial danger to the public health and welfare, including but not limited to,
fish, shellfish, wildlife, shorelines, and beaches." (Emphasis added.) Since the category
of dangers is expressly left open, danger to navigation may or may not be included.
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the public trust has been developed fairly extensively in some states,58
but has received little attention under federal law. Because the
federal government, at least in theory, exercises only delegated
powers, the purposes for which it could exercise the public trust would
perhaps be more limited than would the purposes for which a state
could do so. Thus, in order to justify the exercise of its powers as
trustee, it might be necessary for the federal government to demonstrate that the power was exercised for the purpose of aiding such
federally protectible interests as navigation, commerce, and fisheries.
Under such an approach, the land necessary for surveillance sites
below high-water levels could be acquired without compensating
private landmvners, because the land would be intended for use in
eliminating pollution-a public use in aid of commerce, navigation,
and fisheries.
The development of the "common law of the public trust," however, must be considered as being in a state of infancy, particularly
with respect to the federal government. Moreover, the application
suggested goes somewhat beyond the conventional public-trust theory. 59 Thus, because the doctrine is not sufficiently established to
guarantee the validity of an argument based on such a view of the
navigation servitude, it is necessary to examine other possible theories
for the application of the navigation servitude.
One such approach would be to seek site acquisition on the basis
of an expanded view of the "navigation servitude." It has been suggested that because of the dominant interest of the United States in
land situated within the bed of a navigable stream, such land should
be viewed as a part of the public domain. 60 Therefore, at least when
dealing with problems related to navigation, the authority exercised
by the Government over such land is proprietary in nature-that is,
it is similar to the authority which the Government exercises over
federal public lands in general, pursuant to article IV, section 3,
of the Constitution. Under this approach it may be argued that since
all lands situated within the bed of a navigable stream are a part
of the public domain, and are subject to the proprietary interest of
58. See generally Colberg, Inc. v. State, 67 Cal. 2d 408, 432 P.2d 3, 62 Cal. Rptr. 401
(1967); Crary v. State Highway Commn., 219 Miss. 284, 68 S.2d 468 (1953). For a comprehensive discussion of the development of the idea of the public trust, see Sax,
The Public-Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law, 68 MICH. L. R.Ev. 471 (1970).
59. For the most part, the public-trust doctrine is not directed toward the acquisition of lands for public use; rather it consists of limitations upon what a state
may do with the lands which it already owns. See generally Sax, supra note 58.
60. See, e.g., Bartke, The Navigation Servitude and Just Compensation-Struggle
for a Doctrine, 48 ORE. L. R.Ev. I (1968).
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the United States, they may be utilized by the Government without
compensation to adjoining private owners.
The difficulty with such an expanded view of the navigation
servitude lies in the fact that, although it seems reasonable to view
the dominant interest of the United States in the land in question as
a segment of the public domain, the cases supporting this view of
the servitude have all dealt solely with the question of navigation. 61
Those cases tend to support the narrow view that lands below the
high-water mark are public lands only when the navigation authority
of Congress is being exercised with regard to these lands. It appears,
then, that if the lands are sought to be used by the Government
through an exercise of some authority other than that of navigation,
those lands cannot be considered public lands, and the taking is
therefore subject to the compensation provisions of the fifth amendment.
The fourth and probably most reasonable theory which can be
used in arguing that site acquisition could properly be achieved
under the navigation servitude is based on the proposition that the
traditional view of the navigation servitude is unnecessarily restrictive and has been made obsolete by subsequent developments in
the very precepts of constitutional law upon which it was based. The
concept of the navigation servitude grew out of the early case of
Gibbons v. Ogden, 62 in which it was held that, by virtue of the
commerce clause, the United States has exclusive and absolute control over certain watenvays. Subsequent cases recognized that because
of this exclusive and absolute control, the United States has an
interest in the beds of navigable watenvays-"the navigation servitude"-:which is superior to the rights of private owners.63 According
to those early cases, the servitude exists to serve and make effective
the power of the United States to regulate interstate and foreign
commerce; thus the servitude exists to serve commerce. That
concept, however, reflected the relatively narrow view which those
cases had of the scope of the commerce power of the United States.
Beyond those transactions which were unquestionably interstate or
foreign commerce, the commerce power extended within state lines
only tentatively; and the reach of that power was limited to com61. United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956); United States v.
River Rouge Improvement Co., 296 U.S. 411 (1926).
62. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
63. United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 62 (1913). See
also United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956); United States v. River
Rouge Improvement Co., 296 U.S. 411 (1926).
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merce on navigable waters. The rationale for this limitation was that
since only navigable waters could support commerce, the commerce
power was limited to navigable waterways. 64 Water was thus viewed
merely as a conduit of commerce rather than as an article of commerce. It was in this context that the navigation servitude was
developed. Because that servitude derived its character and limitations from the commerce power which it was intended to effectuate,
it was, like the commerce power, limited in its exercise to purposes
in aid of navigation. Since the time when the navigation servitude
was developed, however, the scope of the commerce power has been
greatly expanded. Moreover, it is unquestionable that water itself
has become an article of commerce rather than a mere "navigation
conduit" and should be considered in that light.65 However sound
its original basis, then, the historical equation of "commerce" with
"navigation" is no longer valid; and the commerce power should
now encompass not only navigable streams, but also all other streams
in which the water itself may be said to be an article of interstate
commerce. And since "commerce" and "navigation" can no longer
be equated, the servitude cannot remain limited in its exercise to
purposes in aid of navigation, but must expand with the commerce
power from which it is derived. For these reasons, the navigation
servitude should be available for use in helping to control pollution.
The conclusion follows that the navigation servitude may be used
to acquire surveillance sites, because those sites will be used in a
program designed to eliminate pollution and consequently to aid
interst,ate commerce by removing a burden on interstate waters.
It seems likely that at least one of the foregoing approaches would
permit the United States to acquire surveillance sites by means of
exercising its navigation servitude. Although a substantial number
of the necessary sites can probably be acquired in this manner, it
may be necessary or desirable in some instances to establish surveillance stations on sites which cannot be obtained through the navigation servitude. For example, sites below the high-water level on
waters which are neither navigable nor interstate may be beyond the
reach of the servitude, as may be sites for stations which must be
established above the high-water level. In those cases, other means
for acquisition must be sought.
64. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
65. Water is now used for public water supply, irrigation, and electrical generation
and is an article of commerce in the market place no less than guns or butter,
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Establishment of Surveillance Stations on Federal Lands

One possible way to acquire sites for surveillance stations other
than by the exercise of the navigation servitude is to place such stations on lands which are already owned by the federal government.
When this course is feasible, problems and costs of site acquisition
may be greatly eased. A threshold question, however, with respect
to whether federal lands can be used for surveillance stations, and
indeed, with respect to whether a surveillance system as contemplated
may be established at all, is whether the Federal Water Quality
Administration is authorized to be a land-administering agency.
Nothing in the applicable statutes appears to prohibit that responsibility; and in certain situations, such as those involving research
stations, 66 that agency already exercises such authority. Nonetheless,
it would be advisable to establish the land-administering authority
of the agency through an opinion either by the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior or by the Attorney General of •the United
States.
Assuming that there is such a land-administering authority, it
will still be necessary, as a general procedural matter in the acquisition of federal lands for surveillance station sites, that the Federal
Water Quality Administration secure the authorization for such use
from the agency responsible for the administration of the lands involved. While special permits may not often be required as a matter
of law, some type of formal arrangement may nonetheless be desirable, because it is important that the sites be segregated from other
uses. That segregation could be accomplished by a special permit, or
by executive withdrawal, or by a suitable declaration prohibiting
conflicting uses.
There is considerable potential for using federal lands as sites
for surveillance stations, since many of the river basins of the United
States drain federal lands upon which stations might be located. The
southeastern river basins, for example, encompass a number of national forests, including the Apalachicalla and Conecuh National
Forests. The Ohio River basin drains the Allegheny, Wayne, Hoosier,
and Shawnee National Forests. The lower Missouri River basin drains
a wide variety of federal lands, including public lands in Colorado
and Wyoming, national forests in Colorado, Wyoming, and Nebraska,
66. See Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, § 105(k), Pub. L. No. 91-224,
§ 105(k), 84 Stat. 91, amending Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 5, 33 U.S.C.
§ 466c (1964), as amended (Supp. IV, 1965-1968), which gives the Secretary authority to
acquire land for demonstration projects, field laboratories, and research facilities.
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and Indian reservations in Nebraska. Indeed, nearly all of the rivers
of the West drain federal lands of every description. In addition,
probably all of the river basins of the United States drain federal
water-project sites which are under the jurisdiction of either the
Army Corps of Engineers or the Bureau of Reclamation. Thus, since
the federal government owns a great deal of land in the United
States, it is possible that a substantial number of the necessary surveillance stations may ultimately be located on federal lands. But significant legal problems may be encountered in an attempt to establish
surveillance stations on the various types of federal lands, and each
category of federal landownership has its own peculiar problems
which must be overcome. The following discussion examines the
problems encountered in some of the more important areas of federal
landownership.

I.

Public-Domain Lands

The term "public-domain lands" as used in this analysis refers
to that portion of the public domain which is under the jurisdiction
of the Secretary of the Interior and which is administered and
managed by the Director of the Bureau of Land Management. The
extent of these lands, particularly in the western states, is vast; and
in the absence of previous withdrawals or reservations, chances are
good that such lands could be made available for surveillance stations.
In order to establish surveillance sites on public lands, it would be
necessary for the Secretary to withdraw the sites from entry. Such
withdrawal may be accomplished pursuant to the Pickett Act61 or
through the exercise of the Secretary's general authority to withdraw
and reserve lands from entry and settlement.68 The Pickett Act grants
the President the authority to withdraw any public lands of the
United States and to reserve those lands for water-power sites, irrigation, classification of lands, "or other public purposes to be specified
in the orders of withdrawals ...." 69 The President has since delegated that authority to the Secretary of the Interior.10
There is little doubt that the establishment of surveillance stations is a "public purpose" as contemplated by the Pickett Act, and
could therefore be the subject of a valid withdrawal. A withdrawal
of lands pursuant to the Pickett Act, however, has one potential
67.
68.
69.
70.

36 Stat. 847 (1910), 43 U.S.C. §§ 141-42 (1964).
United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 326 U.S. 459 (1915).
43 u.s.c. § 141 (1964).
Exec. Order No. 10,355, 3 C.F.R. 873 (1949-1953 comp.).
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pitfall which should not be overlooked. Section 2 of the Act provides
that any lands so withdrawn "shall at all times be open to exploration, discovery, occupation, and purchase under the mining laws of
the United States, so far as the same apply to metalliferous minerals ...." 71 In many cases, such a wide range of potential entry
may not be deemed desirable by the Secretary, and in those cases
limited segregation of lands may be accomplished by means other
than by use of the Pickett Act. For example, if acquisition of the
land is preceded by a retention classification by the Secretary under
the Classification and Multiple Use Act,72 the Secretary may provide
in that classification that the lands be segregated from uses such as
mineral entry.73 Alternatively, it may be possible to insulate the surveillance station site from mining claims simply by seeking a withdrawal by the Secretary pursuant to his general withdrawal authority.74 In order to initiate the withdrawal either under the Pickett Act
or under general withdrawal powers, the Federal Water Quality
Administration would submit an application to the Bureau of Land
Management.75 Upon application, the lands would become segregated
and no longer open to entry.76 I£ the Bureau of Land Management
approved the application, it would issue a final withdrawal order.77

2. National-Forest Lands
Another group of federally owned lands which are attractive for
water pollution surveillance station sites are the national forests.
Indeed, forest lands may prove more important than public-domain
lands as possible sites, because, unlike the public-domain lands, the
national forests are also found in the eastern states, where both the
problems of pollution and the cost of any private land which must
be acquired £or sites are likely to be much greater than they are in
the western states.
The national-forest lands are administered by the Secretary of
Agriculture, and their availability for use in a surveillance system
71. 43 u.s.c. § 142 (1964).
72. 43 u.s.c. §§ 1411-18 (1964).
73. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.2(e)(l) (1969). See generally Comment, The Conservationists
and the Public Lands: Administrative and Judicial Remedies Relating to the Use and
Disposition of Public Lands Administered by the Department of the Interior, 68 MICH.
L. R.Ev. 1200 (1970).
74. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 141 (1964); Exec. Order No. 10,355, 3 C.F.R. 873 (1949-1953
comp.). See also United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915).
75. 43 C.F.R. § 2311.0-6 (1969).
76. 43 C.F.R. § 2311.1-2 (1969).
77. 43 C.F.R. § 2311.1-4 (1969).
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is less clear than is that of the public-domain lands administered by
the Secretary of the Interior. Research has not disclosed any congressional authorization for an interdepartmental transfer or exchange of such lands. It still may be possible to utilize forest lands
for surveillance sites, however, since the Secretary of Agriculture is
authorized, within certain limits, to permit any public agency to
use and occupy land within the national forests for the purpose of
constructing or maintaining any buildings, structures, or facilities
necessary or desirable for any public use. 78
It seems clear that this authorization embraces federal agencies,
such as the Federal Water Quality Administration, in addition to
state and local agencies. Moreover, the language seems broad enough
to authorize the establishment of surveillance stations within the
national forests upon the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture.
As with the public-domain lands79 the possibility of mining entry
may pose some problem, since, absent withdrawal, the national forest
lands are open to mining entry.80 It is unclear, however, in the case
of forests, whether the Secretary of Agriculture can condition the
permits so as to insulate the location from mining claims after the
establishment of the stations, for it is uncertain that he has the power
to order that the lands be withdrawn from entry. Perhaps the Secretary of the Interior could order such withdrawal.81 But whatever the
case, such withdrawals should, if possible, be effected immediately
upon the issuance of the permits.

3. Bureau of Reclamation Project Sites
It is also possible that project sites of the Bureau of Reclamation
could be used as sites for water quality surveillance stations. The
Bureau of Reclamation has acquired jurisdiction over certain potential reclamation project sites in the western part of the United States.
In most instances, the reclamation project sites have been established
by withdrawals from the public lands by the Secretary of the Interior,
pursuant to his authority under section 3 of the Reclamation Act
78. 38 Stat. 1101 (1915), 16 U.S.C. § 497 (1964). The area to be occupied may not
exceed eighty acres, and the period of occupation may not exceed thirty years. In
addition, "[t]he authority provided by this section shall be exercised in such a manner
as not to preclude the general public from full enjoyment of the natural, scenic,
recreational, and other aspects of the national forests."
79. See text accompanying notes 71-77 supra.
80. See 16 U.S.C. § 482 (1964).
81. The Secretary of the Interior does have that authority with respect to lands
under his administration. See text accompanying notes 71-77 supra with respect to the
national-forest lands. 43 U.S.C. § 482 (1964) permits the Secretary to restore mineral
lands to the public domain.
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of 1902.82 I£ any such sites are to be used for surveillance stations,
it would appear advisable to transfer administrative jurisdiction over
a portion of the sites to the Federal Water Quality Administration.
Such an intradepartmental transfer of jurisdiction could be accomplished by a modification of the reclamation withdrawal order,83 followed by a new withdrawal order issued under the Secretary's general authority to withdraw public lands.84 I£ such a formal transfer
is not thought to be feasible, an alternative might be for the Bureau
of Reclamation and the Federal Water Quality Administration to
make an agreement allowing portions of the reclamation sites to be
used for surveillance purposes.815

4.

Corps of Engineers Project Sites

Another category of federal lands which may prove extremely useful as sites for surveillance stations are the lands administered by
the Army Corps of Engineers. These lands are particularly attractive
in that they are located on rivers and are found throughout the
country. Furthermore, the authority for a transfer of rights in these
lands to the Federal Water Quality Administration is clear. The
Secretary of the Army has broad authority to grant licenses or leases
of water resource development lands to public agencies, without
monetary consideration, whenever he determines such action to be
in the public interest. In addition, he has the general power to lease
nonexcess property within his jurisdiction.86 Consequently, few legal
problems, if any, should be anticipated in acquiring surveillance sites
on property under the jurisdiction of the Corps of Engineers. The
possibility of interdepartmental administrative difficulties still exists,
however, and may be more troublesome than the legal questions
involved.87

5.

General Problems with Establishing Surveillance Stations
on Federal Lands

In some instances, federal lands may be devoted by statute to a
single purpose which is incompatible with the establishment and
82. 32 Stat. 388, 43 U.S.C. § 416 (1964).
83. 43 u.s.c. § 416 (1964).
84. See text accompanying notes 67-77 supra.
85. 43 u.s.c. § 387 (1964).
86. 70A Stat. 150 (1956), 10 U.S.C. § 2667 (1964). "Nonexcess property" is property
under the control of the Secretary of the Army other than that which he has determined is not required for the needs and the discharge of the duties of the Army. See
40 U.S.C. § 472(e) (1964).
87. The internecine warfare between federal agencies, particularly in the annual
appropriations battle, is legendary.
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operation of surveillance stations on them. Examples of such singlepurpose federal areas are national parks88 and monuments,89 and
defense or military installations. 90 In such cases, unless suitable alternative sites are available for surveillance activities, legislation may
be needed to broaden the purposes for which the lands may be used.
Of course, in adopting such legislation, Congress would have to
balance the compatibility of surveillance stations with the purposes
for which the lands were originally set aside.
Without advance knowledge of the potential sites for surveillance
stations on federal lands, it is impossible to predict the individual
problems which may arise in each case. As a general proposition,
however, it should be realized that mere federal ownership of a
potential site does not guarantee that, as a practical matter, that
site will be available for surveillance purposes; many interdepartmental and intradepartmental obstacles may make the acquisition
of appropriate sites on federal lands no more feasible than is the
acquisition of similar sites on state or private lands. Even if the
land is available, the economic savings which may be achieved
through use of a federal site may be offset by the costs involved in
proceeding through the intricacies of an intragovernmental land
transfer. Nevertheless, federal lands will frequently offer many advantages over state or private lands and should be considered carefully in site selection. Indeed, if their attractiveness for technological
or scientific purposes is equal to that of alternative sites on state or
private lands, the federal sites would probably be preferable in most
instances, simply because they would not require funding for their
initial acquisition.
C.

Acquisition of Surveillance Sites from States, Municipalities,
or Private Owners

Although a substantial portion of the necessary surveillance sites
may be obtained either through an exercise of the navigation servitude or through the use of federal lands, some acquisition of interests
in state, local, or private lands will probably be necessary for the
establishment of a comprehensive water quality surveillance system.
The following discussion explores the legal problems which may
arise in connection with the acquisition and use of such lands.
88. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1964). See also National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,
Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852.
89. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1964). See also National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,
Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852.
90. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 670a, 670c (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
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Authority of States and Municipalities To Transfer Interests
in Land

An initial problem in acquiring sites from states or municipalities
concerns the authority of those states or municipalities to transfer to
the United States the real property for the sites. Rights which the
federal government might acquire in that property include feesimple title, lease, permanent or temporary easement, or license.
Because it is essential, if the station is to operate indefinitely, that
the interest which is to be acquired for the establishment of that
station be a relatively substantial and permanent one, the authority
to grant licenses, which are generally revocable at will, need not be
considered. Instead, the real question concerns the authority of states
and municipalities to transfer legal interests which are at least as
substantial as a temporary easement.
Because the authority held by the states and municipalities which
own potential surveillance sites is certain to be subject to a multiplicity of local laws, a universally applicable answer to that question
is not possible. Moreover, because of the sheer number of states and
municipalities owning land in the river basins of the United States,
a definitive answer for each particular situation is impossible. For
present purposes, however, it will suffice to state that, as a general
rule, states and municipalities do possess the authority to grant
legal interests in the real property which they own.91
Initially, the acquisition of sites from state or local governments
will require that federal officials consult with the officials responsible
for the management of those areas. In the case of state governments,
the state water pollution control agency or the park commission is
91. The following provisions are representative of state statutes granting authority
to the federal government for the acquisition of state or private lands: Colorado: The
State of Colorado authorizes the State Board of Land Commissioners to sell any state
land in such parcels as the Board shall deem for the best interests of the state. CoLo.
R.Ev. STAT. § 112-3-25 (1963). See also COLO. R.Ev. STAT. § 66-28-3 (Supp. 1967). Florida:
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 6.02 (1961) (emphasis added) provides:
The United States may purchase, acquire, hold, own, occupy and possess such
lands within the limits of this state as they shall seek to occupy and hold as sites
on which to erect and maintain forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other
needful buildings, or any of them, as contemplated and provided in the constitution of the United States; such land to be acquired either by contract with
owners, or in the manner hereinafter provided.
See also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 6.03 (1961); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 589.10 (1962). Tennessee: The
State of Tennessee authorizes the United States to acquire such lands as in the opinion
of the federal government, the State Forester, and the Governor may be necessary for
such projects as the improvement and development of the Tennessee River .Basin.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 11-1001 (1955). See also TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 11-1401, 12-201 (1955):
TENN. CODE ANN. § 11-1416 (Supp. 1969). West Virginia: The State of West Virginia
authorizes the United States to acquire lands in the state by purchase, lease, or condemnation for such purposes as constructing public improvements, or for any other
purpose for which the United States may need the land. W. VA. CODE § 1-1-3 (1966).
See also w. VA. CODE § 20-5A-5 (Supp. 1969).
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often the responsible agency. Other possibilities include the state
highway department, the state planning commission, and the state
public utilities commission. As is the situation with respect to
federal parklands, 92 cases of potential incompatibility of uses may
arise when surveillance sites are sought on state or municipal parklands.93 Unless political accommodations can be made to permit the
establishment of the stations in such areas, 94 alternative sites must
be chosen. In all cases involving the acquisition of state-owned sites,
the state water pollution control agency should be consulted regarding the site selection and acquisition process in order to ensure the
most efficient use of state resources. 911

2. Authority of the United States To Acquire Lands for the
Establishment of a Surveillance System
Assuming that there is the requisite statutory authority to establish water quality surveillance systems,96 it will be necessary for the
Secretary of the Interior or the Federal Water Quality Administration to acquire lands on which to locate such stations. There are at
least four potential methods which can be used for that acquisition.
These methods include the acceptance of sites by donation and the
acquisition of lands by purchase, condemnation, or exchange. Yet
the statutory authority to utilize these methods is not entirely clear.
a. Acceptance of sites by donation. Existing law apparently does
provide for the acceptance of donations of sites for water quality
surveillance. There is a general statutory authority for the Secretary
of the Interior to "accept contributions or donations of ... property,
real, personal, or mixed, for the improvement, management, use, and
protection of the public lands and their resources under his jurisdic92. See text accompanying note 88 supra.
93. There may be statutory restrictions on the uses which may be made of those
lands. See, e.g., ARiz. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 41-511.03 (1957); VA. CODE ANN. § 10-21.4
(Supp. 1968).
94. Accommodations must be made with the state agencies responsible for parklands, and, if statutory restrictions are involved, with the state legislators as well. In
some instances, even the state legislature may be restricted in what it can do with the
state parklands. See, e.g., Gould v. Greylock Reservation Commn., 350 Mass. 410, 215
N.E.2d 114 (1966). See generally Sax, supra note 58, at 493-502.
95. Such consultation with state pollution control officials is desirable and perhaps
necessary even when the lands are sought to be acquired from municipalities. Although
municipalities generally have sufficient authority to grant easements and permits re•
specting municipally owned land, in some instances state control may restrict local
authority. For example, if a state pollution control agency holds powers respecting
the use of state waterways, a municipality may be subject to those restrictions. In any
event, because of the need for cooperation .in pollution control with state officials, it
is desirable to consult the state pollution control agency in any such land acquisition.
96. See text accompanying notes 19-37 supra.
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tion ...." 97 That statute has been administratively interpreted to
authorize the Secretary to accept sites for water research laboratories
which are provided for in the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act. 98 Under this administrative interpretation, it is not necessary
that the acquisition become part of the public lands, "but only that
it will be beneficial in the 'improvement, management, use, and protection of the public lands' "; 99 and since the conservation and development of water resources is directly related to the development and
use of the public lands, "it is within the jurisdiction of the Secretary
of the Interior to accept the donation of land." 100
Since establishment of a water pollution research facility has
thus been found to have enough impact upon the "improvement,
management, use, and protection of the public lands and their
resources . . ." to permit the Secretary to accept donations of land
for that purpose, it seems to follow, although there has been no specific
administrative ruling on the question, that the Secretary should similarly be permitted to accept donations for water quality surveillance
stations for monitoring the flow of waters arising on, or related to,
the public lands. At the very least, then, there seems to be adequate
authority for the Secretary to accept donations of sites for surveillance
stations which would monitor pollution directly affecting the public
lands.
In addition, a strong argument can be made that the Secretary of
the Interior is empowered to accept donations of sites which are not
on waters directly affecting the public lands. The research developments generated by surveillance stations and equipment, wherever
located, will be of ultimate benefit to all the water resources of the
nation, including those on the public lands. Moreover, to the extent
that adequate enforcement of water quality standards depends upon
the existence of a comprehensive system of monitoring stations, it
can be argued that the benefit which will accrue to the public lands
from the control of water pollution will be much greater if such a
comprehensive system of stations is established than if stations are
established only in direct proximity to public lands.
97. 74 Stat. 506 (1960), 43 U.S.C. § 1364(a) (1964).
98. Memorandum from Associate Solicitor for Water Resources and Procurement,
Department of the Interior, to the Assistant Commissioner for Administration, Federal
Water Pollution Control Administration, Nov. 5, 1968. 33 U.S.C. § 466c(e) (1964) authorizes "research, investigations, experiments, field demonstrations and studies, and
training relating to the prevention and control of water pollution."
99. Memorandum from Associate Solicitor for Water Resources and Procurement,
Department of the Interior, to the Assistant Commissioner for Administration, Federal
Water Pollution Control Administration, Nov. 5, 1968.
100. Id.
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It might be objected that such a position stretches the authority
vested by the statute beyond its contemplated limits. However, unlike earlier statutory provisions authorizing the Secretary to accept
donations,1°1 the provision in question here was enacted as a general
authorizing provision, and a broad interpretation is supported by
the other provisions of the same Act. 102 Hence, it does not appear
that further specific legislative authority is necessary to empower the
Secretary of the Interior to accept donations of property for general
purposes relating to the control of water pollution. Nevertheless, if
for other reasons legislative action is necessary in order to establish
a surveillance system, 103 whatever uncertainty does exist with respect
to the Secretary's authority to accept donations could be alleviated
by the inclusion of specific authority in such legislation.
b. Acquisition of sites by exchange. Another means by which
possible surveillance sites could be acquired is exchange. It appears
that it would be possible, particularly in the western states, for the
Secretary to acquire surveillance sites by exchanging public lands
under his jurisdiction. The Taylor Grazing Act104 confers broad
authority upon the Secretary to make such transfers when he finds
that the "public interests will be benefited."105 Presumably, if the
Secretary were to find that the public interest would be benefited by
the establishment of surveillance stations on certain tracts of private
land, his authority to acquire those private lands through exchange
would be clear. The statute, and others of similar effect, 106 are of
101. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 36b (1964) (acceptance of lands by Geological Survey);
43 U.S.C. § 315h (1964) (acceptance of lands for grazing districts); 43 U.S.C. § 1102e
(1964) (acceptance of property to further management of reconveyed Indian lands in
Oklahoma).
102. Pub. L. No. 86-649, 74 Stat. 506 (1960), of which the provision referred to is a
part, also grants to the Secretary the general authority to conduct studies, investigations, and experiments with respect to the improvement, management, use, and protection of public lands and their resources and to enter into cooperative agreements for
those purposes, so long as such agreements are not expressly prohibited. See 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1362-63 (1964). A broad interpretation of the Secretary's authority to accept donations is also supported by the express provision that the statute is not meant to limit
or repeal any previously existing statutory authority empowering the Secretary to
accept contributions or donations. 43 U.S.C. § 1364(b) (1964).
103. See note 40 supra and accompanying te.xt.
104. 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-15g, 315h-15m, 315n, 3150-l (1964).
105. 48 Stat. 1272 (1934), as amended, 43 U.S.C. § 315g (1964).
106. See generally 43 U.S.C. §§ 315m-l to 315m-4 (1964) (Taylor Grazing Act of
1938); 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(b) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968) (National Wildlife Refuge System);
16 U.S.C. § 555a (1964) (exchange of lands under the jurisdiction of the Forest Service); 7 U.S.C. § lOll(f) (1964) (authority of Secretary of Agriculture to deal with
lands acquired for land conservation and land utilization); 16 U.S.C. § 485 (1964)
(exchange of lands in national forests); 16 U.S.C. § 569 (1964) (donations of lands to
the United States for timber purposes); 16 U.S.C. §§ 513-19 (1964) (purchase and exchange of lands for national forests); 16 U.S.C. § 663(c) (1964) (acquisition of lands
for the conservation of wildlife resources).
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somewhat limited application, however, since they are applicable
only under certain statutory conditions. Moreover, because of
the restrictions upon the types of lands which may be exchanged,107
and because the lands which may be desirable for an exchange may
have already been committed to a particular use for the immediate
future, 108 the practical availability of this power of the Secretary
may be further diminished.
c. Acquisition of sites by purchase or condemnation. The statutory authority for the purchase or condemnation of property for
surveillance sites is much more tenuous than is that for the exchange
of property or for the acceptance of donated property. The Secretary
of the Interior does not have general legislative authority for the
purchase of real property; instead, such authority must be set out
by statute for each specific purchase. 109 Thus, although the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act110 authorizes the Secretary to "establish,
equip, and maintain field laboratory and research facilities" in certain designated areas of the country and in other areas as he may see
fit, 111 and although such authority may subsume the authority to purchase lands for the specific facilities enumerated in the section,112 it
is unlikely that the authority would extend to the purchase of sites
for surveillance stations, because such stations are not mentioned in
the statute.113
A second possibility for the requisite authority is found in the
statute authorizing the Secretary to acquire lands for "gaging streams
107. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 315g(b) (1964), which provides that the Secretary in exchange for the private lands acquired, may "issue patent for not to exceed an equal
value of surveyed grazing district land or of unreserved surveyed public land in the
same State or within a distance of not more than fifty miles within the adjoining State
nearest the base lands."
108. There may be some question, for example, whether the Secretary may transfer
a fee interest in grazing land if that land is currently being used under a grazing
permit. Grazing permits have been held to create actionable rights in the holder, and
some statutes confer preferential rights to such permits on owners of contiguous land.
Moreover, if the land has been classified under 43 U.S.C. § 1411 (1964) for retention
in public ownership for a use which is not consistent with private ownership (such
as wilderness preservation), there may be an additional impediment to effecting site
acquisition by the transfer method.
109. See 41 U.S.C. § 14 (1964).
110. 62 Stat. 1155 (1948), as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 466-66k (1964), as amended, 33
U.S.C. §§ 466-66n (Supp. IV, 1965-1968), as amended, National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852, as amended, Water Quality Improvement
Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91.
111. 33 U.S.C. § 466c(e) (1964).
112. See 22 OP. AITY. GEN. 665 (1889).
113. Indeed, the Office of Solicitor concluded that "[t]he Secretary of the Interior
does not have authority to acquire real property for purpose of his functions and
responsibilities under the Federal ·water Pollution Control Act ••••" Memorandum
of Assistant Solicitor, Water Pollution Control, Department of the Interior, March 10,
1967. However, the ·water Quality Improvement Act of 1970 has removed that restriction. See text accompanying note 118 infra.
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and underground water resources." 114 Under that statute, the Secretary may acquire lands for use by the Geological Survey by donation,
purchase, or by condemnation; but he may do so only when funds
have been specifically appropriated by Congress. Whether that statute can be construed to permit the acquisition of sites for water
quality surveillance depends initially upon whether "gaging" used
in the statute includes the measurement of water quality or whether
it is limited to the determination of the amount of water volume and
flow. The legislative history of the statute clearly indicates that the
sites are to be used by the Geological Survey in its activities relating
to the measurement of streamflow and water supply. 115 Nothing in
the language of the statute or in its legislative history, however, indicates that the authority is broad enough to empower the Secretary to
acquire lands for water quality surveillance sites. Even if the statute
does envisage measurement of water quality as well as quantity, the
question remains whether the language "for use by the Geological
Survey" precludes the acquisition of sites for use in a surveillance
system to be administered by the Federal Water Quality Administration. The answer appears to be that such acquisition is precluded.
Serious problems would inevitably arise in the appropriations process in Congress if the Federal Water Quality Administration were
to acquire lands under the statute authorizing acquisition for the
Geological Survey. It is not likely that Congress would appropriate
funds for site acquisition by the Geological Survey, if it knew that
the sites would in fact be used by, or transferred to, the Federal
Water Quality Administration. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the
Geological Survey itself would be willing to seek and disburse appropriated funds in order to provide surveillance sites for another federal
agency in the Department of the Interior. The foregoing considerations suggest that it would not be possible for the Secretary to acquire
lands under the Geological Survey Statute for use as surveillance
sites; indeed, the Office of the Solicitor has held that in general
"[t]he Secretary of the Interior does not have authority to acquire
real property for purpose of his functional responsibilities under the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act ...." 116 It is less clear, however, whether the statute precludes the concurrent use of the lands
by the Geological Survey and the Water Quality Administration.
114. 56 Stat. 1086 (1942), 43 U.S.C. § 36b (1964).
115. See H.R. REP. No. 1847, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942), and the transmittal letter
of the Department of the Interior contained in that report.
116. Memorandum of Assistant Solicitor, Water Pollution Control, Department of
the Interior, March 10, 1967.
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Surely sites acquired under this statute and used by the Geological
Survey could not be used concurrently for such federal purposes as
military activities by the Department of Defense or housing by the
Department of Housing and Urban Development. But, the same
logic does not necessarily apply to a joint use by the Federal Water
Quality Administration, since the use of the sites by that Administration would be similar to the stream-gaging functions performed by
the Geological Survey. Moreover, although Congress' specific requirement that the sites be used by the Geological Survey appears to preclude an intradepartmental transfer of jurisdiction to the Federal
Water Quality Administration, Congress has not precluded interagency cooperation not involving an intradepartmental transfer of
functions; and even though it may not be possible for the Secretary
to acquire surveillance sites under the Geological Survey statute, it
may well be possible to utilize existing Geological Survey sites within
a general system of water quality surveillance. Apparently some steps
in this direction have already been taken, for the Geological Survey
has offered to increase its gaging activities to include the collection
of water quality data for the Federal Water Quality Administration.
Such an activity is merely informal and involves no intradepartmental
transfer of functions. If this effort should prove to be successful, it
will be a healthy initial step toward interagency cooperation in the
establishment of a comprehensive water quality surveillance system.
Nevertheless, it is clear that even well-developed cooperative
efforts wtihin the Department of the Interior will not be sufficient
to establish a complete surveillance system. Furthermore, even if it
is possible to make full utilization of the possibilities for site acquisition by the use of the navigation servitude, by the utilization of federal lands, by donations, and by exchanges, it will probably not be
possible to establish a complete system without some additional provision by Congress.
D.

Site Acquisition Under the Water Quality Improvement
Act of 1970 and Recommended Legislation

Legislation which has been enacted in the current session of Congress does not appear to provide the necessary specific authority for
the acquisition of surveillance sites. The Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970,117 which was signed by the President on April 3,
1970, is an amendment to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.
It permits the Secretary of the Interior to acquire land for certain
117. Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91.
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limited purposes by purchase with appropriated or donated funds,
by donation, or by exchange for public lands under his jurisdiction.
The language of the Act granting the Secretary the authority to
acquire lands is prefaced by the words: "In carrying out the provisions of this section relating to the conduct by the Secretary of demonstration projects and the development of field laboratories and
research facilities, the Secretary may acquire land ...." 118
As discussed previously, the authority to acquire sites for "field
laboratory and research facilities" is probably not sufficient to encompass the acquisition of sites for surveillance stations.119 Indeed,
at least arguably, the Secretary has for some time possessed that authority.120 On the other hand, the Secretary's authority to acquire
lands for "demonstration projects,"121 might seem to offer some assistance in this regard. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act had
previously authorized demonstration projects relating to the development of "[i]mproved methods and procedures to identify and measure the effects of pollutants on water uses, including those pollutants
created by new technological developments ...." 122 If that language
is broad enough to include surveillance stations, the conclusion then
follows that the Water Quality Improvement Act, by expressly authorizing the acquisition of land "[i]n carrying out ... demonstration
projects ... ,"123 thereby authorizes the acquisition of land for the
stations. It is unlikely, however, that this language is sufficiently encompassing, because the authorization relates to "demonstration projects" rather than to a complete system for surveillance and for the
enforcement of water quality standards. Furthermore, the language
of the Act relates to the identification and measurement of "the
effects of pollutants on water uses" rather than the continuous surveillance and monitoring of water quality itself.
Consequently, notwithstanding the judgment of some staff members who have worked closely with the legislation, it appears that the
Water Quality Improvement Act does not provide the necessary authority for the acquisition of sites for water quality surveillance
facilities. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the confer118. Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 5(k), Pub. L. No. 91-224, § 105(2), 84
Stat. 91.
119. See text accompanying note 110 supra.
120. See text accompanying notes 110-12 supra.
121. Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 5(k), Pub. L. No. 91-224, § 105(2), 84
Stat. 91 (1970).
122. 43 U.S.C. § 466c(d)(B) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
123. Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 5(k), Pub. L. No. 91-224, § 105(2), 84
Stat. 91 (1970).
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ence report which accompanies the House and Conferees' version of
the Act makes no reference to land acquisition for purposes of surveillance activities. It is therefore necessary that additional legislation be enacted not only to authorize the establishment of a water
quality surveillance system, 124 but also to provide for the acquisition
of the necessary sites for surveillance stations. A draft of proposed
legislation designed to achieve these objectives is set forth in the
Appendix to this Article.125

Ill.

THE .APPLICATION OF A WATER QUALITY SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM:
THE EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF DATA COLLECTED

An important purpose of an efficient water quality surveillance
system would be to assist federal and state officials in determining
compliance and noncompliance with water quality standards. But if
the data are to be used directly in judicial enforcement of such standards by means of the abatement proceedings authorized under the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act,126 the data must be sufficient
to meet requisite evidentiary standards. Just what those standards are
in this area is not entirely clear. The Federal Water Pollution Control
Act provides that if the preliminary-conference and hearing-board
procedures have been used, 127 the Court shall receive into evidence
a transcript of both of those proceedings. 128 In addition, the Act provides in section IO(c)(5) that the Court shall receive "such additional
evidence, including that relating to the alleged violation of the
[water quality] standards, as it deems necessary to a complete review
of the standards and to a determination of all other issues relating
to the alleged violation." 129 In another section, the Act provides
that the court shall receive "such further evidence as the court in
its discretion deems proper." 130 Unless the language of those latter
124. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
125. See pp. 1165-66 infra.
126. 62 Stat. 1155 (1948), as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 466-66k (1964), as amended, 33
U.S.C. §§ 466-66n (Supp. IV, 1965-1968), as amended, National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852, as amended, ·water Quality Improvement
Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91.
127. The conference and hearing board procedures need not always be utilized in
abatement proceedings. Under 33 U.S.C. § 466g(c)(5) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968), for example, the only requirement for the abatement of a violation of water quality
standards is six-months notice; the conference and hearing-board requirements are
waived.
128. 33 U.S.C. § 466g(c)(5) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
129. 33 U.S.C. § 466g(c)(5) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
130. 33 U.S.C. § 466g(h) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
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two sections granting discretion to the court can be construed as
meaning that the court may apply whatever evidentiary requirements it pleases-an unlikely interpretation-it would appear that
the standards applied to such further evidence must be those of the
usual rules of evidence. Thus it seems clear that any surveillance
data introduced in the judicial proceeding must meet generally established requirements for the competency of evidence produced by
scientific instruments.
In order to meet that burden, three requirements must be met:
(1) the type of apparatus must be accepted as dependable for the
purpose for which it has been used by the profession concerned in
that branch of science or art; (2) the particular apparatus used must
be one constructed according to an accepted type and must be in
good condition for accurate work; and (3) the person using the apparatus must be qualified by training and experience for its use. 131
To satisfy the first requirement, the offering party must show that
the device or method used has gained general acceptance in its field
as a trustworthy and reliable procedure. 132 If the accuracy and reliability of the device are notorious and well established, the judge may
take judicial notice of this fact and no further proof is necessary. 133
But, if the equipment's accuracy and reliability are not generally
known, it is necessary to qualify the equipment as dependable by the
testimony of witnesses who are experts in the particular field. Because the proposed monitoring and transmission system will be novel
in many respects, it is likely that general scientifc acceptance cannot
be shown and that qualification by expert testimony will therefore
be necessary. Second, it is necessary to show by expert testimony that
the particular apparatus is constructed according to an accepted type
and that at the time at which the data in question were collected,
the apparatus was in good condition to perform accurate work. To
show that the equipment was accurate at the time of use, it is generally necessary that the system have been tested for accuracy on the
date of the charged violation. 134 The third requirement-that the
person interpreting the data be qualified for the job by training and
experience--can be met simply by testimony demonstrating the
training and experience of the witness.
131. J. WIGMORE, THE SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF 450 (3d ed. 1937).
132. Lindsay v. United States, 237 F .2d 893, 896 (9th Cir. 1956).
133. See State v. Dantonio, 18 N.J. 570, 115 A.2d 35 (1955).
134. See State v. Dantonio, 18 N.J. 570, 115 A.2d 35 (1955); State v. Moffitt, 100 A.2d
778 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1953); Carrier v. Commonwealth, 242 S.W.2d 633 (Ky. Ct. App. 1951).
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With respect to the proposed monitoring and transmission system,
the qualification of the equipment and of its operator probably can
be met fairly easily. However, the need to show that the equipment
was accurate at the time at which the data were collected poses more
difficult problems. Indeed, since the surveillance system would be
composed of remote, unattended monitoring stations, that testing
requirement may be difficult, if not impossible, to meet. Therefore,
unless specific statutory authority is enacted to make surveillance data
admissible as evidence in abatement proceedings, it may not be possible under the traditional rules of evidence to use the data collected
as direct evidence in judicial abatement proceedings.
Nevertheless, even if such statutory authorization is not forthcoming, a surveillance system can still be a crucial element in the
control of water pollution. The important research and planning
functions served by a surveillance system would not be affected by
the inability to use the data as direct evidence in abatement proceedings. Even with respect to abatement proceedings, the use of surveillance data as direct evidence is not essential. In fact, under the
present structure of the Act, such use of the data may not be necessary, at least in cases in which a conference and a hearing board are
called prior to the initiation of abatement proceedings,135 because in
such cases the bulk of the evidence used in the proceedings consists
of the record developed at the administrative level136-in the investigatory conference137 and before the hearing board.138 The inability
to use the surveillance data directly in a judicial proceeding does not
mean that this evidence cannot be used in the administrative proceeding, for the evidentiary requirements of the administrative proceeding are not necessarily the same as those of a judicial proceeding
for abatement. Under the Administrative Procedure Act,139 it is
clear that the evidentiary requirements are far less strict than they
are in a judicial proceeding, particularly with respect to questions of
hearsay and of competency of evidence. 140 Thus, since the evidence
135. But see note 127 supra.
136. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 466g(c)(5), (h) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
137. 33 U.S.C. § 466g(d) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
138. 33 U.S.C. § 446g(f) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
139. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
140. Section 7(d), 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968), provides in part:
Any oral or documentary evidence may be received, but every agency shall as a
matter of policy provide for the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly
repetitious evidence. A sanction may not be imposed or rule or order be issued
except on consideration of the whole record or those parts thereof cited by a party
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used by the court in an abatement proceeding consists largely of the
record of the administrative proceedings, and of the Secretary's recommendations made on the basis of the evidence received in the
administrative proceedings, it is clear that data from a surveillance
system may still play an important role in the enforcement of the
water pollution control laws, at least in those cases which undergo
administrative scrutiny prior to abatement. 141
Moreover, probably the greatest contribution which a surveillance system will make toward the effective enforcement of pollution
control laws is not in the role of providing direct evidence in either
administrative or judicial proceedings. Rather, its greatest contribution lies in the area of the detection of pollution and polluters. Undoubtedly it is in the area of detection that present law and practice
are most lacking, for there simply are no systematic procedures for
detection. Once the Secretary has reason to suspect that a person is
violating water quality standards, he has authority under the Act
to require that person to disclose in a report the extent of polluting
substances which he has discharged.142 Certainly, that procedure may
help to gather probative evidence for an abatement proceeding, but
its operation is predicated upon the Secretary having first detected
the polluter and called a conference. If a surveillance system can
fulfill the function of the initial detection, a major step will have
been taken toward the control of water pollution.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing considerations, it may be concluded
that the establishment of a federal water quality surveillance system
is a necessary prerequisite to the effective implementaiton of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act. Moreover, although there is
no specific authorization in the existing laws for the establishment of
a surveillance system, such authorization seems to be implicit in the
and supported by and in accordance with the reliable, probative, and substantial
evidence.
Congress, in enacting the Administrative Procedure Act, omitted from the final bill
the requirement that evidence in administrative proceedings be "competent," although
earlier drafts of the bill had made "competency" a requirement. Evidence may be "re•
liable, probative, and substantial" for purposes of an administrative determination
even though that evidence would not be "competent" in a judicial proceeding. United
States ex rel. Dong Wing Ott v. Shaughnessy, 116 F. Supp. 745, 750 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TEXT§ 14.05 (1959).
141. See note 127 supra.
142. 33 U.S.C. § 466g(f) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
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general context of the Act. At the same time, however, the caveat
should be offered that the Act is deficient in that it lacks specific
authority for site acquisition and for the procurement of equipment.
Consequently, the Act should be augmented by supplemental legislation.
Furthermore, in view of the fact that the existing law places upon
state water pollution control agencies much of the initial responsibility for the enforcement of water quality standards, the federal
water pollution surveillance system should be developed in close
cooperation with relevant state agencies and officials in order to
minimize any duplication of facilities and surveillance activities.
In this connection, it is suggested that any new legislation should
clarify the relative roles of federal and state officials in the enforcement and abatement process and should specifically assign responsibility or provide for the coordination of activities in the operation of
surveillance facilities.
.APPENDIX

Suggested Amendment
Section 10. Section 10 of the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act, as amended (33 U.S.C. § 466g [(1964), as amended, (Supp. IV,
1965-1968)]), is amended:
(a) by redesignating sub-subsections (6) and (7) of subsection (c)
as (8) and (9);
(b) by inserting after sub-subsection (5) of subsection (c) two
new sub-subsections to read as folows:
"(6) In carrying out his duties under this section, the Secretary is authorized to establish, equip, and maintain a
water quality surveillance system for the purpose of
monitoring the water quality of interstate waters or
portions thereof and detecting the existence and nature
of pollutants therein.
"(7) The Secretary is authorized, on behalf of the United
States and for use by the Federal Water Quality Administration in carrying out the duties under this section,
to acquire land or interests therein and necessary access
rights by purchase, with appropriated or donated funds,
by condemnation, by donation, or by exchange for ac-
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quired or public lands under his jurisdiction which he
classified as suitable for disposition. The values of the
properties so exchanged either shall be approximately
equal, or if they are not approximately equal, the values
shall be equalized by the payment of cash to the grantor
or to the Secretary as the circumstances require."

